Go straight to the text of this page
Certford Licensing exams, read against their own documents

Facts checked Nov 19, 2026 against NCBE’s published pages

Bar Exam · MBE · § 2 Practice test

Bar exam practice questions, Multistate Bar Exam (MBE)

Each figure on this page points to one of 10 documents; the latest reading of them was on Nov 19, 2026.

These bar exam practice questions follow the multiple-choice day of the legacy bar exam, the Multistate Bar Examination (MBE): fact patterns of up to a long paragraph, four answer choices, one best answer. The set has 28 items and gives every subject on NCBE's outline the same share, as the scored part of the test does. Every choice gets its own explanation, the correct option and each wrong one alike. None of the items is an NCBE question; each was screened for a rival correct choice and against the rules in force before it was explained.

This page, section by section 7
  1. § 1 The practice set, every choice explained
  2. § 2 Bar exam questions: what this set covers
  3. § 3 How each item and its notes are laid out
  4. § 4 NCBE's own questions, and why none appear here
  5. § 5 Practicing for an exam with a final date
  6. § 6 Overview, subject notes, scoring and registration
  7. § 7 Where these items come from, and which law they follow
§ 1

The practice set, every choice explained

Answers given: 0 of 28. Matching the key: 0.

I. Civ Pro · 25 scored items Question 1 of 28 Supplemental

A citizen of State A sued a corporation, a citizen of State B, in federal court on a state-law fraud claim, seeking $200,000. The plaintiff then moved to add as a co-plaintiff under Rule 20 a consumer who is a citizen of State B. The consumer's $150,000 fraud claim arises from the same sales campaign and presents common questions.

The action is not a class action, and no federal claim is asserted. The corporation opposed the motion.

Should the court allow the joinder?

Pick a letter: the verdict follows the last option, and the reasoning under all four opens.

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why A is right. A State B plaintiff suing a State B corporation removes complete diversity, and supplemental jurisdiction cannot cure that defect under Exxon v. Allapattah, so the joinder must be denied.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why not B. Meeting the amount in controversy does not help when the parties are not diverse; both requirements must be satisfied, and citizenship fails here.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why not C. Section 1367(b) lists claims by Rule 19 and Rule 24 plaintiffs but not Rule 20 plaintiffs, so it does not bar them all; the problem is the lost diversity, not this subsection.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why not D. Supplemental jurisdiction can carry a co-plaintiff's claim that falls short on amount, but it never supplies jurisdiction once complete diversity is gone.

The rules behind it: Civil Procedure

I. Civ Pro · 25 scored items Question 2 of 28

A plaintiff's federal complaint asserts two claims. The defendant's answer includes a counterclaim, and the plaintiff's answer to the counterclaim asserts an affirmative defense. The defendant moved under Rule 12(f) to strike both the affirmative defense and one of the plaintiff's claims, which it called redundant.

The court finds that the affirmative defense is legally insufficient. It also finds that the challenged claim, though somewhat repetitive, states a valid claim and is not redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous.

How should the court rule on the motion?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why not A. Only the defense meets a Rule 12(f) ground; a claim that states a valid cause of action and is not redundant cannot be struck because it overlaps with another.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why B is right. Rule 12(f) lets the court strike an insufficient defense and redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter; the defense is legally insufficient, while the claim fits none of those labels.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why not C. This reverses the findings: some repetition does not make a valid claim redundant, while the insufficient defense is exactly what the rule reaches.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why not D. Keeping the defense ignores the court's finding that it is legally insufficient, which is a ground Rule 12(f) expressly gives for striking it.

The rules behind it: Civil Procedure

I. Civ Pro · 25 scored items Question 3 of 28

In a federal action, a plaintiff's lawyer filed a brief citing three cases that do not exist. On its own initiative, the court ordered the lawyer to show cause why the brief did not violate Rule 11. The lawyer responded that the court could not sanction him because he had not been given 21 days to withdraw the brief before the order issued.

Is the lawyer correct?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why not A. The safe harbor protects against motions served by an opponent; court-initiated proceedings are a separate track without that waiting period.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why not B. Rule 11(c)(3) expressly lets the court order a lawyer to show cause on its own initiative, so no party motion is needed.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why C is right. The 21-day chance to withdraw is built into Rule 11(c)(2) for a party's motion; when the court acts on its own under Rule 11(c)(3), it issues a show-cause order and no safe harbor applies.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why not D. Citing authority that does not exist is a classic Rule 11 violation, since legal contentions must be warranted by existing law; contempt is not the governing frame here.

The rules behind it: Civil Procedure

II. Con Law · 25 scored items Question 4 of 28

Over two years, a man sent hundreds of unsolicited social media messages to a local musician, including 'Die' and 'You're being watched.' The musician was frightened and canceled performances. The man was convicted under a statute punishing communications that a reasonable person would regard as threatening; the jury was instructed that it need not find anything about the man's own understanding of the messages. He appealed on First Amendment grounds.

Should the conviction be reversed?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why not A. How a reasonable listener would react is the objective test the Court rejected as the sole standard, since it ignores what the speaker understood.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why not B. The speaker need not mean to act on the threat, and the Court chose recklessness over a specific intent to threaten, so this sets the bar too high.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why not C. True threats are unprotected, but the state still has to prove the speaker's own mental state, and the jury was told it need not find one.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why D is right. In Counterman v. Colorado (2023), the Court held that a true-threats prosecution requires proof that the speaker consciously disregarded a substantial risk his words would be seen as threatening; a purely objective instruction falls short.

The rules behind it: Constitutional Law

II. Con Law · 25 scored items Question 5 of 28 Takings

A state regulation requires agricultural employers to allow union organizers onto their farms for up to three hours a day, 120 days a year, to speak with employees. The growers receive no compensation. The growers sued the state, claiming the regulation is a taking of their property without just compensation. The state argues that the access is limited and the growers retain full use of their land.

Are the growers likely to prevail?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why not A. The Court treated a recurring entry right as an appropriation even though it was limited in hours and days, so its intermittent character does not avoid a taking.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why not B. Whether a rule substantially advances a state interest is a due process question, not a takings test, and the Court has rejected it as a basis for takings liability.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why not C. Retained use matters to regulations that restrict use; a government-authorized physical invasion is analyzed as an appropriation, where remaining value is no defense.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why D is right. Cedar Point Nursery (2021) held that a rule granting organizers a right to enter private farmland physically appropriates the owner's right to exclude, which is a per se taking.

The rules behind it: Constitutional Law

II. Con Law · 25 scored items Question 6 of 28

During an overseas military conflict, a strike threatened to halt production at plants that make military equipment. The President issued an executive order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of and operate the plants. When Congress enacted the federal labor statute governing such disputes, it considered and expressly rejected an amendment that would have authorized presidential seizures of plants. The plant owners sued to enjoin the seizure.

Should the court grant the injunction?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why not A. No general emergency power lets the President override Congress at home; claimed national-security needs did not save the seizure.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why not B. The President has some independent constitutional powers and may act in a zone of congressional silence, so express statutory authorization is not always required.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why not C. The war power does not reach domestic labor disputes and private property far from any theater of combat, as the Court held in rejecting this argument for the seizure.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why D is right. When the President takes measures incompatible with the will of Congress, his power is at its lowest; Congress rejected seizure authority, and seizing domestic plants exceeds what he can do alone (Youngstown).

The rules behind it: Constitutional Law

II. Con Law · 25 scored items Question 7 of 28

A federal statute authorizes the Attorney General to suspend the deportation of certain noncitizens but provides that either house of Congress may, by resolution, overturn any suspension. The House of Representatives passed a resolution overturning the suspension granted to a noncitizen, and the Senate took no action. The noncitizen challenged the resolution in court.

Is the resolution valid?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why not A. Delegating discretion to suspend deportation is permissible; the defect lies in the veto Congress kept for itself, not in the grant of authority.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why B is right. Overturning an executive decision on a noncitizen's status is legislative action, which requires bicameral passage and presentment; a one-house veto skips both (INS v. Chadha).
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why not C. Congress may oversee by hearings, funding, or new legislation, but it cannot keep a veto that alters legal rights without passing a law.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why not D. Broad power over immigration still has to be exercised through the constitutional lawmaking procedure, so the subject matter does not validate a one-house resolution.

The rules behind it: Constitutional Law

III. Contracts · 25 scored items Question 8 of 28 Excuse

A concert hall contracted with a renowned pianist for a solo recital on June 10 for a $40,000 fee. On June 5, the pianist broke her wrist in a fall, and her doctor forbade her to play for two months. The pianist promptly notified the hall, which canceled the recital and refunded tickets, losing $25,000 in profits. The hall sued the pianist for its lost profits.

Is the pianist liable?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why not A. The hall bargained for this renowned artist, so her duty is personal and cannot be performed by a substitute; the possibility of a replacement does not keep her liable.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why not B. The refunds do not erase the hall's lost profit, and they are not why she escapes liability; the excuse is the impossibility of her own performance.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why not C. Courts treat the continued health of a personal performer as a basic assumption of the contract, so a disabling injury excuses rather than shifts the loss to her.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why D is right. In a contract for personal services, the performer's death or disabling illness discharges the duty as impossible, so the pianist owes nothing for the hall's lost profits.

The rules behind it: Contracts

III. Contracts · 25 scored items Question 9 of 28

A developer's construction company owed a lumber supplier $50,000, and the supplier refused to deliver more lumber on credit. The developer, who owned the land being built on and stood to profit greatly from finishing the project, orally told the supplier, 'Keep delivering to my company, and if it doesn't pay you, I will.' The supplier delivered $30,000 more lumber. The company did not pay, and the developer refused to pay, raising the statute of frauds.

Is the developer's defense likely to succeed?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why not A. Full performance by the other side takes a contract out of the one-year provision, not out of the suretyship provision, so delivery alone does not defeat the defense.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why not B. The lumber went into the developer's own land and project, so he did benefit; the facts show the economic interest that triggers the exception.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why not C. That is the general suretyship rule, but it does not apply when the promisor acts mainly for his own benefit, which is the situation here.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why D is right. Under the main-purpose rule, a promise to pay another's debt is outside the suretyship provision when the promisor's leading object is his own economic benefit, as finishing his own project was.

The rules behind it: Contracts

III. Contracts · 25 scored items Question 10 of 28

A woman left her antique watch for cleaning with a jeweler who both repairs watches and sells new and used watches. The jeweler wrongfully sold the watch to a customer, who paid a fair price and had no reason to know that the jeweler did not own it. When the woman learned of the sale, she sued the customer to recover the watch.

Is the woman likely to recover the watch?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why not A. It is true that a repair bailee lacks voidable title, but the entrustment rule works without it: dealing with the goods' merchant is enough to protect a good-faith buyer.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why not B. Paying value helps qualify the customer as a buyer in ordinary course, but price alone does not defeat the owner; the entrustment to a watch dealer is what does.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why C is right. Under UCC 2-403(2), entrusting goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives the merchant power to transfer the owner's rights to a buyer in ordinary course, which the customer was.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why not D. Ordinarily a bailee cannot pass a title it lacks, but a bailee who deals in goods of that kind can pass the entruster's rights to a buyer in ordinary course.

The rules behind it: Contracts

IV. Crim Law & Pro · 25 scored items Question 11 of 28

A father left his loaded handgun on a low coffee table while he went to take a shower. His four-year-old son, who was playing in the room, picked it up and fatally shot himself. The jury finds that the father never thought about the risk that the child would reach the gun, but that his failure to perceive that substantial risk was a gross deviation from the care a reasonable parent would exercise. The jurisdiction has adopted the Model Penal Code.

Of what crime can the father properly be convicted?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why not A. Murder under the Code requires purpose, knowledge, or recklessness showing extreme indifference to human life, none of which fits a parent who did not perceive the danger.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why B is right. The Model Penal Code makes a death caused negligently, meaning by failing to perceive a substantial risk that a reasonable person would have perceived, negligent homicide, which is this finding.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why not C. Manslaughter under the Code requires recklessness, a conscious disregard of a known risk, and the jury found the father never thought about the risk at all.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why not D. Criminal negligence is enough for negligent homicide, and the jury found his failure to perceive the danger a gross deviation from a reasonable parent's care, which meets it, so the father is not blameless.

The rules behind it: Criminal Law and Procedure

IV. Crim Law & Pro · 25 scored items Question 12 of 28 Homicide

During a heated argument in a bar, a man saw the other patron reach into his jacket. Honestly believing the patron was drawing a knife, the man shot and killed him. In fact, the patron was reaching for his phone, and the jury finds that the man's belief was unreasonable under the circumstances. The jurisdiction recognizes imperfect self-defense.

Of what crime can the man properly be convicted?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why A is right. Where imperfect self-defense is recognized, an honest but unreasonable belief in the need for deadly force negates malice and reduces an intentional killing to voluntary manslaughter.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why not B. Involuntary manslaughter covers unintended killings by criminal negligence or during unlawful acts; the man shot intending to kill, so the mitigated offense is the voluntary form.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why not C. An intentional killing would be murder, but the honest belief in a threat removes the malice that murder needs in a jurisdiction recognizing the doctrine.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why not D. A killing in self-defense is justified only when the belief in the threat is both honest and reasonable, and the jury found this one unreasonable, so the killing is mitigated, not justified.

The rules behind it: Criminal Law and Procedure

IV. Crim Law & Pro · 25 scored items Question 13 of 28

A man was convicted of assault, which carries a maximum sentence of 10 years. At sentencing, the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that the man had chosen his victim because of the victim's race. Under the state's hate-crime statute, that finding raised the maximum to 20 years, and the judge sentenced him to 15 years.

Is the sentence constitutional?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why not A. A judge may weigh facts to choose a sentence within the authorized range, but a fact that lifts the ceiling is treated as an element for the jury.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why not B. The label does not matter: whatever the legislature calls it, a finding that increases the maximum penalty must go to the jury.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why not C. Punishing the selection of a victim because of race targets conduct, not belief, and is constitutional (Wisconsin v. Mitchell); the flaw is the procedure, not the enhancement.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why D is right. Any fact other than a prior conviction that raises the maximum sentence must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt (Apprendi), and the 15 years exceed the 10-year maximum for assault alone.

The rules behind it: Criminal Law and Procedure

IV. Crim Law & Pro · 25 scored items Question 14 of 28 Counsel

A man charged with robbery asked to represent himself at trial. The judge questioned him and found that he was competent to stand trial and that he understood the risks of self-representation and was knowingly and voluntarily giving up his right to counsel. The judge nonetheless denied the request because the man had no legal training and would likely do a poor job. He was convicted with appointed counsel.

Was his Sixth Amendment right violated?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why not A. The right is not absolute: it requires a timely, knowing waiver and can be lost by serious misconduct, so the stated reason is too broad.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why B is right. A competent defendant who knowingly and voluntarily waives counsel has a right to represent himself, and his lack of legal training is not a ground to deny it (Faretta).
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why not C. Limits exist, for instance for serious mental illness or disruptive conduct, but a general worry that a layperson will defend poorly is not one of them.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why not D. Standby counsel may assist a self-represented defendant, but appointing counsel cannot replace the defendant's right to conduct his own defense.

The rules behind it: Criminal Law and Procedure

V. Evidence · 25 scored items Question 15 of 28 Hearsay

A defendant is charged with robbing a store. The prosecution offers testimony from the store's owner that, seconds after the robber fled, the clerk ran into the back office screaming and trembling, "He said he'd come back and kill me if I called the police!" The clerk cannot be located for trial. The defendant objects on hearsay grounds.

Should the owner's testimony be admitted?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why not A. Rule 805 admits hearsay within hearsay when every part is covered, so layered statements are not barred as such.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why not B. The excited-utterance exception applies whether or not the declarant testifies, and a frightened cry to a coworker is not testimonial, so the clerk's absence does not matter.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why C is right. Nested statements come in when each part fits an exception or exclusion; the robber's words are a threat, offered as a verbal act rather than for their truth, and the clerk's shout is an excited utterance.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why not D. Each level needs its own basis; the inner statement's admissibility says nothing about the clerk's report, which qualifies on its own as an excited utterance.

The rules behind it: Evidence

V. Evidence · 25 scored items Question 16 of 28 Relevance

A defendant is charged with wire fraud for diverting $50,000 of client funds into his own account, which requires proof of intent to defraud. He offers evidence that he returned all the money to the clients' account three weeks later, before anyone had noticed the transfer and before any investigation began. He claims he believed he was entitled to a temporary advance. The prosecution objects.

Should the evidence be admitted?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why A is right. Relevance is a low bar: repaying the money quickly and before anyone noticed makes his claimed belief in a temporary advance somewhat more likely, so it bears on intent and comes in.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why not B. Rule 407 bars using later safety measures to prove fault against the party who took them; repaying money is not such a measure, and the rule does not stop a defendant from offering his own conduct on intent.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why not C. The jury may weigh the repayment but need not accept it; evidence is admitted for any tendency to prove a point, not because it settles the issue.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why not D. Returning money does not undo a completed fraud, but the evidence is offered on what he intended at the time, and that use makes it relevant.

The rules behind it: Evidence

V. Evidence · 25 scored items Question 17 of 28 Expert

In a civil fire-damage case, the plaintiff's fire-cause expert testified that the fire started in the defendant's space heater. She based her opinion partly on a written statement from a neighbor, which is inadmissible hearsay but is the kind of material fire investigators reasonably rely on. On direct, the plaintiff's lawyer asks her to read the neighbor's statement to the jury. The defendant objects.

Should the statement be read?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why A is right. Rule 703 lets an expert rely on inadmissible facts of a kind experts reasonably use, but the proponent may disclose them to the jury only if their value in assessing the opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why not B. That is the ordinary Rule 403 test, which favors admission; for an inadmissible basis Rule 703 reverses the presumption, so the statement stays out unless its value substantially outweighs the prejudice.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why not C. Reasonable reliance makes the opinion proper but does not open the door to reading the inadmissible basis to the jury; disclosure needs the reverse balancing test.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why not D. Experts may rely on inadmissible material of a kind reasonably used in their field, so the opinion itself is proper; only disclosing the statement is restricted.

The rules behind it: Evidence

V. Evidence · 25 scored items Question 18 of 28

Two business partners jointly met with a lawyer to form a company and asked how to divide ownership. Both partners attended every meeting, and the lawyer represented them both. Years later, one partner sued the other, claiming that the defendant promised at one of those meetings to give the plaintiff a larger share.

The plaintiff called the lawyer to testify about what was said at that meeting. The defendant asserted the attorney-client privilege.

Should the lawyer be permitted to testify?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why not A. Who paid the fee does not decide whose communications are privileged; the testimony comes in because of the joint-client exception.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why B is right. When two clients consult a lawyer jointly on a common matter, their communications are privileged against outsiders but not in a later dispute between the clients themselves.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why not C. Confidentiality toward the world remains, but joint clients share their communications with each other, so neither can invoke the privilege against the other.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why not D. Waiver is beside the point, because in a suit between former joint clients the privilege never applied to their shared consultations to begin with.

The rules behind it: Evidence

VI. Real Property · 25 scored items Question 19 of 28

A widow signed a valid contract to sell her farm to a buyer for $500,000. Before closing, she died. Her will, executed years earlier, left 'all my real property to my son and all my personal property to my daughter.' The buyer paid the $500,000 to the widow's executor, and the executor conveyed the farm.

The jurisdiction has no statute on the point. The son and the daughter each claim the $500,000.

Who is entitled to it?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why not A. The will's two gifts are not merged or split because property changed form; the asset is classified once, and the converted interest falls into the personal property gift.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why not B. Equitable conversion operates exactly while the contract is executory, from signing until closing, so the unfinished sale is what converts her interest.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why C is right. Under equitable conversion, a binding contract of sale treats the seller as owning the right to the price, which is personal property, so the proceeds pass with her personal estate.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why not D. Her bare legal title was held only as security for the price; equity treated the buyer as the owner of the land once the contract became binding, so what she owned at death was a right to money.

The rules behind it: Real Property

VI. Real Property · 25 scored items Question 20 of 28

A landowner conveyed a lot "to a man and his heirs, provided that if liquor is ever sold on the lot, the grantor or her heirs may re-enter and retake it." The jurisdiction applies the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities. Sixty years later, after the landowner had died intestate leaving a daughter as her sole heir, the man's successor opened a liquor store on the lot. The daughter promptly gave notice that she was exercising the right of re-entry and sued for possession.

Is the daughter likely to prevail?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why not A. The Rule reaches interests created in third parties; interests retained by the transferor are treated as vested and are exempt, so the right does not fail for remoteness.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why not B. A right of entry is an inheritable interest, so it passed at the landowner's death to her daughter as sole heir.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why C is right. Future interests kept by the grantor, including a right of entry, are not subject to the common-law Rule, and the right descends to her heir, who properly exercised it.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why not D. The Rule applies to interests created by deed as well as by will; the grantor's right wins because of its retained character, not because a deed created it.

The rules behind it: Real Property

VI. Real Property · 25 scored items Question 21 of 28

A homeowner built a garage relying on a licensed surveyor's stake. Two years later, a new survey showed that the surveyor had erred and that one corner of the garage extended six inches onto a neighbor's vacant lot. Removing or moving the garage would cost $80,000. The six-inch strip has no practical use to the neighbor, who refused an offer of payment and sued for a mandatory injunction ordering removal.

Should the court order the garage removed?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why A is right. For a slight, good-faith encroachment, courts balance hardships and may deny a mandatory injunction when removal would be grossly disproportionate to the harm, awarding damages instead.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why not B. The homeowner does not claim title to the strip; the question is the remedy for an innocent encroachment, which is decided by balancing hardships.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why not C. Injunctions against encroachments are common, but they are equitable and discretionary, so 'always' misstates the rule for an innocent, trivial intrusion.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why not D. Laches requires unreasonable delay that prejudices the other side, and suing soon after a new survey revealed the error is neither.

The rules behind it: Real Property

VI. Real Property · 25 scored items Question 22 of 28

A homeowner's lot borders a navigable river. The city built a jetty upstream that changed the river's current. Over the next 15 years, soil gradually and imperceptibly built up along the homeowner's bank, adding a 30-foot strip of dry land.

The homeowner had nothing to do with building the jetty. The city claims the new strip because its jetty caused it to form.

Who owns the strip?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why not A. Building the jetty gives the city no claim to the new dry land along someone else's bank; ownership follows the shoreline, not the cause of the deposit.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why B is right. Land added slowly and imperceptibly along the bank belongs to the owner of the bank, and under the majority view this holds even when someone else's structure caused the deposits.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why not C. The strip is now dry land attached to the lot, and the lot's boundary moves with gradual change, so navigability does not give the state the new land.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why not D. Most courts deny accretion only to an owner who caused the artificial deposit himself; a homeowner who had nothing to do with the jetty still takes the land.

The rules behind it: Real Property

VII. Torts · 25 scored items Question 23 of 28 Nuisance

A company illegally dumped debris that blocked a public highway for a month. Most motorists simply took a five-minute detour. A trucking company whose only access to its warehouse was by that highway had to close the warehouse for the month and lost substantial business. Both a commuter and the trucking company sued the dumping company for public nuisance.

Which plaintiff can maintain the action?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why not A. Public officials are the usual plaintiffs, but a private party with a different-in-kind harm may also sue, so the trucking company has standing.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why not B. Inconvenience shared with every motorist is harm in degree at most, so the commuter cannot sue; only a distinct injury supports a private action.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why C is right. A private plaintiff may sue for a public nuisance only with a harm different in kind from the public's; losing the only access to its warehouse is that harm, while a short detour is not.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why not D. Business losses from being cut off are a classic special injury in public nuisance cases, so the economic character of the loss does not bar the trucking company.

The rules behind it: Torts

VII. Torts · 25 scored items Question 24 of 28 Products

A drug manufacturer's own studies showed that its new arthritis drug caused severe liver damage in a small percentage of users who also drank alcohol. The manufacturer made the drug exactly as designed but did not mention the risk to physicians or on the label. A patient who drank moderately took the drug as prescribed and suffered liver failure. The patient sued the manufacturer in strict products liability.

Is the patient likely to prevail?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why A is right. A product is defective when the seller fails to give a reasonable warning of a risk it knew about; the maker knew of the alcohol-related liver danger and warned neither doctors nor patients.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why not B. Many useful drugs carry serious side effects, so the possibility of harm does not make a drug defectively designed; the defect here is the missing warning.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why not C. The absence of a manufacturing defect does not dispose of a warning claim, which is a separate kind of defect.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why not D. A favorable balance of benefits and risks can defeat a design claim, but it does not excuse failing to warn about a known risk to some users.

The rules behind it: Torts

VII. Torts · 25 scored items Question 25 of 28 Duty

A bus passenger began shouting threats at another passenger and brandishing a broken bottle. The driver saw this for several minutes but kept driving and did nothing, although he could have stopped the bus and called the police, as company policy required. The threatening passenger then cut the other passenger. The injured passenger sued the bus company.

Is the company likely to be liable?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why not A. Carriers owe a high duty of care but are not insurers, so the company answers for the driver's failure to act, not for every injury suffered on board.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why not B. The no-duty rule gives way where a special relationship exists, and carrier and passenger is a classic one, so the company owed a duty.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why not C. A criminal act is not superseding when it is the very danger the defendant's duty was meant to guard against, as this attack was.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why D is right. The carrier-passenger relationship creates a duty to use reasonable care against foreseeable harm from other passengers; the driver watched the threat for minutes and did nothing.

The rules behind it: Torts

VII. Torts · 25 scored items Question 26 of 28

A shopper slipped on a grape in a grocery store's produce aisle. The grape was black, dried, flattened, and covered with dirt and cart-wheel marks. The store's records showed that no employee had inspected or swept that aisle for more than two hours.

No one knew how the grape got there. The shopper sued the store, and the store moved for summary judgment on the ground that there was no evidence of how long the grape had been on the floor.

Should the court grant the motion?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why not A. A store's liability for a floor hazard rests on negligence, meaning notice and a failure to act on it, not on the mere presence of produce on the floor.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why B is right. A store that did not create a hazard is liable if it had constructive notice; a dried, dirty, flattened grape and two hours without an inspection let a jury infer the grape lay there long enough.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why not C. Circumstantial evidence may establish how long a hazard existed, and certainty is not the standard for surviving summary judgment.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why not D. Creating the hazard is only one route to liability; a store also answers for a danger it should have found through reasonable inspection.

The rules behind it: Torts

I. Civ Pro · 25 scored items Question 27 of 28

Two former employees of a railroad sued it in federal court for breaching a settlement agreement that promised them free lifetime travel passes. All parties are citizens of State A. The complaint alleged that the railroad will rely on a new federal statute restricting free passes, and that the statute does not apply to them. The railroad moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Should the court grant the motion?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why A is right. Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, federal law must appear in the plaintiff's own claim; here the claim is for breach of contract and the statute enters only as the railroad's defense, so there is no arising-under jurisdiction.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why not B. The need to interpret federal law to decide a defense is not enough; jurisdiction depends on the claim as properly pleaded, not on how the case will be decided.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why not C. Contract claims can arise under federal law when federal law creates the right sued on, so the dismissal rests on the defense rule, not on a categorical bar.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why not D. Anticipating a defense in the complaint does not convert it into part of the plaintiff's claim, so pleading the statute's meaning adds nothing to jurisdiction.

The rules behind it: Civil Procedure

III. Contracts · 25 scored items Question 28 of 28

A bookstore mailed a publisher a purchase order for 500 copies of a new bestseller, stating: "Ship all books by August 15 for fall semester." The publisher replied with its acknowledgment form, which accepted the order but added: "Orders filled subject to availability. No liability for late shipments."

Both parties are merchants, and neither objected to the other's form. The publisher shipped only 300 books, on August 20, and the bookstore lost sales as a result. The bookstore sued the publisher.

Is the publisher liable for the bookstore's losses?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why not A. A definite and seasonable acknowledgment operates as an acceptance even though it adds terms, so the exchange of forms did form a contract.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why not B. The contract kept the bookstore's August 15 date, so the late shipment of the 300 copies was also a breach, not only the shortfall.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why C is right. The acknowledgment accepted the order, and between merchants an added term drops out if it materially alters the contract; a clause excusing short and late shipment would cause surprise and hardship.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why not D. Additional terms join a contract between merchants only when they are not material alterations, and a clause stripping liability for late or short delivery is material.

The rules behind it: Contracts

§ 2

Bar exam questions: what this set covers

Bar exam questions come in three forms on a legacy exam, and they are scored as separate components: the multiple-choice day, the essays and the performance tasks. In a UBE total the weights are 50% for the multiple-choice day, 30% for the essays and 20% for the performance tasks.

This page covers only the first form. The essays and the performance tasks are written work graded by each jurisdiction's readers, so a multiple-choice set does not stand in for them. The quiz below spreads its items evenly over Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Contracts, Criminal Law and Procedure, Evidence, Real Property and Torts.

§ 3

How each item and its notes are laid out

An item opens with the facts, then a closing sentence asks for a result: whether a motion is granted, which crime is proved, who takes title. The four choices often share a conclusion and differ in the reason given, so the notes under each one name the rule that makes it right or wrong rather than only marking it.

Unless an item says otherwise, the notes apply generally accepted principles, the standard NCBE describes for the test, and not the rule of any single state. A missed item points to a section of the subject notes, which follow NCBE's outline category by category.

§ 4

NCBE's own questions, and why none appear here

NCBE keeps the questions of a sitting secure, so none of them appear on this page. NCBE offers free sample questions and the outline, and sells study aids built from retired questions; the prices are in the table below. Certford neither reproduces nor rewords any of that material.

Fact Summary of the source Source
Practice material from NCBE NCBE’s free sample questions and the subject outline; paid study aids are built from retired MBE questions. The MBE Complete Practice Exam costs $100, a 500-question bundle $200, each of Practice Questions 1–3 $50, and the 210-question booklet $125 ($100 as a PDF). MBE format MBE study aids
Exam security A secure exam: NCBE forbids sharing or even describing its questions, during or after the test. No practice item here comes from NCBE. Each one began in an older test-prep question bank and was reworked: answered without the key, checked for a rival correct choice, compared with the rules and doctrine now in force, and explained choice by choice. Released MBE questions and NCBE’s paid aids are protected by copyright, so none are copied. MBE map MBE test day
Options per item Choose the best of four answers; marking two counts as wrong. MBE format
Law assumed in answers Generally accepted fundamental legal principles unless an item says otherwise. The outline assumes Title 28 with the federal civil and evidence rules as currently in effect, and the Official Text of UCC Articles 1 and 2; in Torts, joint and several liability and pure comparative fault apply by default. MBE format MBE outline 2020

From NCBE's MBE format and test-day pages and its legacy study aids page, read November 19, 2026.

§ 5

Practicing for an exam with a final date

NCBE lists three more sittings, February 24, 2027, July 28, 2027 and February 23, 2028, all of them on the outline the remaining MBEs follow. This set is written to that outline.

A first group of 10 jurisdictions switched to NextGen in July 2026, and NCBE's table dates the rest from July 2027 to July 2028, with each jurisdiction listed on the bar exam page. Where a board has moved, the law in these items still applies, because the seven subjects stay in NextGen's scope. The question formats differ, so check the format your board names and NCBE's table by jurisdiction.

§ 6

Overview, subject notes, scoring and registration

§ 7

Where these items come from, and which law they follow

Are these bar exam practice questions NCBE questions?

No. None comes from NCBE, and none rewords an NCBE sample or study aid. Before an item went on this page it was answered without the key, checked for a second defensible choice and compared with the rules in force, and each choice got its own explanation.

Does the set match the subject balance of the scored part?

In proportion, yes. The scored part has seven subjects, each with 25 scored questions; here, too, no subject gets more items than another.

Do the explanations follow the law of my state?

They follow generally accepted principles, as NCBE describes for the test, unless an item names a different rule. A state answer that departs from that standard is not used as a key.

Can a percentage on this set be turned into a scaled score?

No. Each form is equated, which means no one can say in advance which raw total produces which scaled score; the scoring page explains the method.

The page’s documents, by number

10 · all read Nov 19, 2026

Rules and traps for each area of the outline, with sample items, are in the MBE study guide.